Bytes transferred over the selected time period
Learn more...Total & HTTP bytes
Protocols from AS43324
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AS43324 Information
Copy link- Name
- DESTINY-FAROYA
- AKA
- DESTINY FAROYA
- Country / Territory
- Belgium
Insight into HTTP requests distribution
Insight into adoption and usage of key protocols
Insight into network and application layer attack traffic
Insights based on DNS queries to 1.1.1.1 DNS resolver
Application and Network layer DDoS attack trends
Radar report
BGP is vulnerable to routing hijacks and path leaks that negatively impact traffic on the Internet. RPKI helps solve some of these problems, but for some forged paths, we need to rely on a simpler mechanism: First AS enforcement in BGP.
Bryton Herdes, Bryce Walters, Mingwei Zhang